Samenvatting van de eerste Bijbelbespreking in de Protestantse Gemeente Ter Apel.
Onderwerp was Romeinen 1:1 - 4
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Samenvatting van de eerste Bijbelbespreking in de Protestantse Gemeente Ter Apel.
Onderwerp was Romeinen 1:1 - 4
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Beker in his book on Paul – see previous posts - considers the ethical necessity for Christians as closely linked to the apocalyptic expectation of the divine indicative, which he sees in Käsemann’s correction to Bultmann’s existentialist approach.
But to Beker, Christian ethics is definitely aimed at the future cosmic-theocentric affirmation of Christ in the final redemption. All of the activity that Christians are commanded to do is defined as redemptive activity, pointing toward its final consummation in the future kingdom. So it is not the indicative itself that motivates obedience, but more precisely the indicative and “pattern” of the eschatological judgment, and the imperative of Christian obedience serves as a pathway to the final indicative of the glory of God. The soteriological effects of Christ’s victory in the future are the telos of Christian obedience, but not its motivating ground. Christian obedience does not stand on the basis of a present reality; it has the character of hope.
Beker sees his view confirmed in Romans 12. The use of the term “bodies” here refers, in his view, to the ontological solidarity between Christians and a world still under the power of death. At the same time, the “body” suggests the ethical seriousness of life in the Spirit “because believers are called to challenge the power of death in the world.”[1] Christian obedience is therefore determined by solidarity with the world and proleptic faithfulness to the new life that God has ordained for his creation. The Christological indicative does not completely fill up the apocalyptic indicative: the last judgment is still there as a reminder of the seriousness of the need for solidarity with a fallen world.
The problem with Beker’s approach is that if eschatology grounds ethics, all ethics of necessity becomes an interim ethic (the final indicative even swallowing up the imperative), and man simply has to await the coming of the new kingdom to see his obedience evaporate into thin air, along of course with any thought of merit. The imperative then has meaning only as long as Christians are still living within the old world, and only for that world. Christian ethics can then easily become the ethics of the present age, to which the element of a redemptive scheme provides only the hermeneutic and the motivational background. That is so because it is held at the same time that the apocalyptic vision of the future kingdom cannot be expressed in terms of precise behavior or values. Congruence between ethical acts today and the apocalyptic indicative cannot be established with certainty, only some tendencies or probabilities might be construed that give some direction to ethics.
The basic flaw in this scheme of things is this: to Paul the righteousness of God is revealed in the faithfulness of Christ to the God of the covenant. Jesus’ dedication to God’s kingdom was therefore firmly rooted in His dedication to God as the One who promised ultimate redemption. [2]
So our dedication in obedience to Christ must be rooted primarily in dedication to God. It is not based on any specific character of God’s revelation to us, but only modified by it. Christian ethics, we contend, is not rooted in the eschatology of God’s future redemption, and is not rooted in the present soteriology of Christ’s Spirit as reality in us, but it is established in the Cross as the basic symbol of complete dedication to God.
In other words, Christian ethics is the ethics of the present Lord Jesus Christ who showed in his humiliation and death the way that God provides to become righteous.
[1] J.C. Beker Paul, p. 289.
[2] Cf. Thomas Finger, Christian Theology (1985) II, p. 93.
This connection between indicative and imperative is meant as a polemical stance towards Jews and Jewish Christians because it “eradicates the works of the law and any fearful striving for acceptance in the last judgment, as if the Messiah had not already come.” [1] If the nature of righteousness is at stake, as in Romans and Galatians, Paul will emphasize the indicative, but where there is danger of the exaggeration of the “exclusive celebration of the indicative.” Paul stresses the imperative, as in 1 Cor.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to see Paul’s ethic only in this tension between indicative and imperative. Beker explains this issue by making reference to the debate between Bultmann and Käsemann:
“Ernst Käsemann has inserted a new dimension into the discussions. With Bultmann, he locates the heart of Paul’s gospel in " the righteousness of God," but he disputes Bultmann’s interpretation of it. ’The righteousness of God’ has an apocalyptic derivation and denotes both God’s power and His gift. It expresses God’s cosmic claim on the world, which is proleptically made manifest in the lordship of Christ and in which the believer participates through obedience.
The lordship of Christ, however, does not rob believers of their volition; they are not simply pawns in a cosmic struggle, because their obedience demonstrates their allegiance to God’s sovereign will for his creation. According to Käsemann, the obedience of Christians must be viewed in the context of their solidarity with the created order, which comes to expression in Paul’s definition of "the body" (sooma).
In other words, Käsemann advances the discussion of the relation of the indicative and imperative in Paul, which had heretofore been dominated by Bultmann’s definition of "the body" as a person’s relation to himself. This existentialist definition of "the body" neglects its cosmic-historical character and spiritualizes a person’s relation to the world. It causes an existentialist narrowing of both the indicative and imperative, because indicative and imperative are here construed as an antinomy or paradox in which God’s gift in Christ is simultaneously an appeal to our decision to become bearers of the cross in each moment of time.
The problem is that a precise explication of this antinomy or dialectic remains hermeneutically vague. Bultmann defined it in terms of possibility and actualization and so not only endangered Paul’s emphasis on the actuality of God’s act of salvation in Christ but also overemphasized the human will.”[2]
[1] J.C. Beker , Paul p. 255.
[2] J.C. Beker, Paul, p. 263
We must come now to the question of what kind of response Paul expected from his paraenesis, what kind of obedience is implied in all these specifications of the commandment of love.
In general, we have found both in Galatians and in Romans that the way of life of Christians is determined by a threefold freedom: freedom from sin, from death, and from (an incorrect interpretation of) the law. It is not freedom from all restraints, since the believer is liberated to a new service. But this service seems to be rather paradoxical. “The servant of Christ” is at the same time a freedman of the Lord (1 Cor. 7:22). We are freed as was Israel: in order to obey. For Christians more particularly: to lead a life in the Spirit that allows God through us to fulfill the claim the law has on us (Rom. 8:3).
What character does this new Christian imperative have? Bultmann and others have argued that, to Paul, the imperative follows the indicative. Let’s use this idea for a moment. In our passage we might look at 12:1 as a case in point.
The exhortation is motivated “by the mercies of God”; the “sacrifice” is reference to Christ’s sacrifice for us (Rom. 5). The “indicative” of what God has done in Christ not only serves as a motivating force; it also expresses a reality in which we already share. The gift of the Spirit turns an eschatological future into a present reality.
The spirit therefore can be expressed both as the power by which the believer can act in obedience and the standard by which he measures his acts, combining indicative and imperative. Gal. 5:25 expresses this duality: “If we live in the Spirit, let us also walk in the Spirit.”
Yoder presupposed that the authorities mentioned in Romans 13:1 (and the parallel passages in 1 Tim. 2 and 1 Peter 2) refer to the state as such. Romans 13, of course, has been most often interpreted like that, and we have quoted another solution above. But how can we possibly identify the “kings and people in high places” in 1 Tim. 2 with the state?
1 Peter 2:13 speaks about human institutions and mentions the emperor or his governors. Again, with Käsemann, we must say at least that the powers are personalized, though we prefer to state that the powers are being seen on the level where they are represented by individuals.
In Romans 13, we would have to accept that Paul changes from his perspective on Christian morality, the application of love for the enemy, to the perspective of the state. But we find the position persuasive that the terminology of Romans 13 points toward the embodiment of the state in bearers of authority who continue the intersubjective framework of chapter 12.
The point might be, then, that we never accept the state as such, but always and only specific people who use power, on the presumption that they do so with the object of doing good.
It would mean that the state, per se, is mentioned only in Revelation 13 in the typical language of apocalyptic prophecy: the beast coming from the sea. The powers that govern the world are personalized, and only when the system dominates all the people in it and the intersubjective perspective of Romans 13 cannot be employed any longer, the state is envisioned as “beastified,” in the language of the Apocalypse.
“Christ is not only the Head of the Church; he is at the same time Lord of History, reigning at the right hand of God over the principalities and powers. The old eon, representative of human history under the mark of sin, has also been brought under the reign of Christ (which is not identical with the consummate kingdom of God, 1 Cor. 15:24).”[1]
We may therefore expect that the evil, which is inherent in the power of the state does not simply create chaos but is made subservient to God’s purpose. In Yoder’s words:
“The characteristic of the reign of Christ is that evil, without being blotted out, is channeled by God, in spite of itself, to serve God’s purposes.”
So we would confirm the state, not as created or instituted by God, but at least as a means by which God brings order and gives “room for growth and work of the Church.” Yoder may say that in such a way the violence of the state is not redeemed or made good, but is made subservient to God’s purposes. It may ultimately serve some good, and in that respect at least it earns some legitimacy.
However, this will only be true, Yoder explains, for a given state if it does not add to the evil already there. The state has on some occasions subscribed to a moral value, punishing the guilty and saving the innocent. Then evil is used for a good purpose, though it in itself remains evil.
The demoniac state, however, denies all moral responsibility, punishing the innocent and rewarding the guilty, as in Revelation 13. The state as such therefore cannot be called good, but some of its actions though can be called good to the extent that they do not add to the evil already there!